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SECURITIES LAW
Steven S. Thel*
The Fifth Circuit decided some important securities cases dur-
ing the survey period and issued some interesting opinions. Al-
though the court consistently claimed a conservative reliance on
precedent and seldom acknowledged making new law, it inter-
preted some well-established doctrine in surprising ways. The past
year's opinions in fraud cases provide guidance in the related areas
of reliance, damages, and plaintiff's due diligence. The year also
witnessed important developments in the law governing the rela-
tionship between brokerage firms and their clients.
The most spectacular development in this area during the sur-
vey year was the October collapse in security prices. In light of the
crash and increasing volatility in the securities markets, many have
come to question the nature of the relationship between the price
of securities and their value. In the spirit of the times, this survey
starts with two opinions dealing with the relationship between
price and value.
RELIANCE AND DAMAGES
"[R]eliance is an issue in all Rule 10b-5 cases."' Traders often
have difficulty proving that they were in fact influenced by misrep-
resentations they actually heard, and it is obviously difficult for
traders to prove they relied on misrepresentations they never
heard. The so-called fraud-on-the-market theory provides that se-
curity traders should sometimes be presumed to have relied on
misrepresentations. A presumption that traders have relied can
significantly change the way fraud cases are handled-particularly
by facilitating the use of class actions 2-and the way they are
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. The author thanks
Herbert Lee and Brian Racine for their research assistance.
1. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 548 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
2. Many investors may be injured by one misrepresentation. A class action to rectify a
misrepresentation may be impractical if each injured investor must prove she changed her
position in reliance. If reliance is presumed, all questions except damages will usually be
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decided.
In 1981, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, accepted a form of
presumptive reliance in Shores v. Sklar.' However, the plaintiff in
that case alleged extreme misconduct, and the opinion seemed to
allow the presumption only in extreme cases. Early in the survey
year the Fifth Circuit revisited the doctrine of presumptive reli-
ance in Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp." The Finkel court's inter-
pretation of Shores expanded the scope of the doctrine substan-
tially beyond the limits Shores was sometimes thought to have set.
Later in the survey year, the question was further complicated
when the Supreme Court accepted the fraud-on-the-market theory
in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. The analytical framework set out in
Finkel is more complicated than that used by the Supreme Court
in Basic, primarily because the circuit court had to work around
Shores. In the future, the court will have to decide how much of
Shores and Finkel survives Basic.
Finkel was a class action brought on behalf of all those who
purchased stock of Docutel/Olivetti Corporation during a period in
which Docutel had publicly overstated the value of its inventories.'
The plaintiff alleged that Docutel purchased inventory from a re-
lated company at inflated prices, but concealed this fact until it
was forced to take substantial write-downs in connection with its
year-end audit. She charged that in so doing, Docutel and certain
of its affiliates had violated rule 10b-5.7 According to the court of
appeals, the thrust of her complaint was that "the delay in taking
the write-downs defrauded purchasers of Docutel stock who
bought it [during the period that the value of the inventory was
overstated] by causing them to buy the stock at an inflated price."8
Without ever certifying the class, the district court dismissed the
complaint because the plaintiff failed to plead individual reliance.
The court of appeals reversed, explaining that the district court
common, and once a measure of damages is chosen, the calculation of individual awards will
seldom require separate trials. Even if defendants are entitled to rebut the presumption by
showing that some investors did not in fact rely, it is unlikely that they will be able to do so
or that their attempts will make a class action inappropriate.
3. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
4. 817 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988).
5. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
6. 817 F.2d at 358. The district court dismissed the complaint before it decided
whether to certify the class.
7. Id. at 357-58 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5).
8. Id. at 358.
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had not appreciated the full scope of Shores.'
Shores has to be the starting point of any discussion of the
fraud-on-the-market theory in the Fifth Circuit. The plaintiff in
Shores alleged that the defendants sold worthless revenue bonds
by means of an elaborate fraudulent scheme.10 Although the plain-
tiff alleged that the offering circular for the bonds contained nu-
merous falsehoods, he admitted that he bought the bonds on his
broker's recommendation and had never read the circular.'" The
entire court of appeals agreed that the district court correctly dis-
missed the complaint to the extent the plaintiff had pleaded "the
usual" misrepresentation or omission case under the second clause
of rule 10b-5, which declares false statements and half-truths ille-
gal.12 The court held that reliance was an essential element of such
a case and that the plaintiff's admission that he had not relied on
the circular was conclusive on the issue. 3
The Shores complaint, however, tracked all three clauses of
rule 10b-5, and a majority of the court, over a vigorous dissent,
concluded that even though the plaintiff had not alleged reliance
on the offering circular, he might recover under the first clause,
which declares it unlawful to employ any scheme to defraud, and
the third clause, which forbids engaging in any practice that oper-
ates as a fraud." The majority held that the plaintiff's confidence
in the integrity of the municipal authorities who authorized the
bonds and his reliance on the availability of the bonds as an indi-
cation that they were entitled to be marketed would be reliance
enough if the bonds would not have been marketable at any price
absent the scheme. 5
The complaint in Finkel also tracked the language of all three
subparts of rule 10b-5. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's dismissal as to claims made under the second clause of the
rule based on the plaintiff's failure to allege that she had read or
had relied on any of the documents in which she claimed Docutel's
financial situation was misrepresented." However, the court re-
9. Id.
10. 647 F.2d at 464.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 467-68.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 469 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5).
15. 647 F.2d at 470.
16. 817 F.2d at 363.
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versed the dismissal of the claims under the first and third clauses.
The court held that although reliance is a cornerstone of any claim
under rule 10b-5, it will be presumed when the defendants have
engaged in secret, pervasive, and material misconduct. 17 The de-
fendants will then have the burden of rebutting the presumption
of reliance by showing either that the nondisclosure of their con-
duct did not affect market price or that the plaintiff actually knew
the undisclosed information or would have purchased the security
at the same price even if she had known. 8
Finkel went a long way toward making the Fifth Circuit fraud-
on-the-market doctrine intelligible, but now that the Supreme
Court has entered the field in Basic, the question is whether
Shores and Finkel are still good law. The key to a fraud-on-the-
market claim under Shores and Finkel is making out a claim under
the first or third clauses of rule 10b-5, that is, alleging a scheme to
defraud or a course of business operating as a fraud. Exactly what
allegations will satisfy this test is unclear. It is not enough that the
defendants have misrepresented material facts-the plaintiff must
allege something that can be characterized as "fraud on a broader
scale."' 9 More importantly, the scheme must be "primarily one of
nondisclosure," although the incidental making of material misrep-
resentations will not be fatal.20
In Basic, the Supreme Court overruled Shores and Finkel to
the extent they held that the fraud-on-the-market presumption is
appropriate only when plaintiffs complain of nondisclosure of per-
vasive fraudulent schemes.2 Basic was a class action brought on
behalf of persons who sold stock in a period during which the is-
suer falsely denied it was involved in merger negotiations. The Su-
preme Court held that when misleading statements of material fact
"have been disseminated into an impersonal, well-developed mar-
ket for securities, the reliance of individual plaintiffs on the integ-
rity of the market price may be presumed."2 The Court did not
treat the complaint as alleging a pervasive fraudulent scheme, and
it noted incidentally that the relevant part of rule 10b-5 was the
17. Id. at 364.
18. Id. at 364-65. The plaintiff need not show that the security to which the scheme
relates is traded in a well-developed market, but if it is not, the defendant will presumably
be able to show that the failure to disclose had no effect on price. See id. at 361 n.12, 362.
19. Id. at 362 (quoting Shores, 647 F.2d at 472).
20. Id. at 363.
21. 108 S. Ct. at 994.
22. Id. at 991.
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second clause.23
Although the Supreme Court has ruled that the fraud-on-the-
market presumption is appropriate in the "usual" misrepresenta-
tion case under rule 10b-5, the presumption's reach may extend to
the unusual case as well under the Fifth Circuit decisions. Shores
has sometimes been interpreted to hold that plaintiffs are entitled
to the presumption of reliance only if they can prove that the se-
curities they bought would not have been marketable at any price
but for the fraudulent scheme. Finkel firmly rejected any such lim-
itation and, in so doing, highlighted the continued importance of
Shores. Finkel explained that Shores focused on marketability, not
because it adopted a limited presumption of reliance, but because
the revenue bonds involved in that case were not traded in an ac-
tive market. Reliance is an aspect of causation. In the usual case, a
plaintiff must show that a misrepresentation caused her injury by
showing that she relied on the misrepresentation to her detriment.
Prices on developed markets reflect all available information, in-
cluding false statements, so a misrepresentation conveyed to a de-
veloped market can cause injury to those who participate in the
market even if they do not hear it. The premise of the fraud-on-
the-market theory is that investors should be entitled to rely on
the integrity of the market. Perhaps, as Finkel puts it, the market
is the "theoretical agent" of the investor, 2' and when a security is
actively traded, the important question is not whether the investor
relied on the misrepresentation, but whether the market did. Be
that as it may, the theory justifies a presumption, if at all, only
with respect to securities trading in a well-developed market.
When, as in Shores, price is not set by market forces, an inves-
tor must claim more than merely that she relied on the integrity of
prices set by the market. Shores protected reliance on the availa-
bility of a security as evidence that it was entitled to be sold. The
way the court explained it in Finkel, Shores did not adopt a re-
strictive version of the fraud-on-the-market theory in which reli-
ance is to be presumed only when fraud makes it possible to mar-
ket otherwise unmarketable securities.2 5  Instead, Shores
expansively interpreted the theory to encompass these cases, and
in so doing permitted a presumption of reliance in cases in which
23. See id. at 983 n.6.
24. 817 F.2d at 360.
25. Id. at 358.
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no market exists at all.26
If the court affirmed its solicitude for buyers in Finkel, it
showed that solicitude has its limits in James v. Nico Energy
Corp.27 The plaintiff in that case realized a gain of about 500% on
his investment in oil wells promoted by the defendants. 2 His good
fortune may have obscured the merits of his rule 10b-5 claim and
may have led the court to restate its standard measure of damages
in a way that will exonerate perpetrators of fraud who sell securi-
ties that ultimately appreciate in value. Perhaps more importantly,
the court did not take advantage of a particularly good opportu-
nity to reconsider its standard measure of damages.
Nico Energy Corporation was formed to exploit oil leases on
three tracts of land.29 Shortly after it was formed, Nico decided to
drill an exploratory well on an eighty-acre well site on one of the
tracts. The well site was located within a 711-acre portion of the
tract that was outside a flood plain.30 Nico raised funds for the
exploratory well from a small group of investors. Investors in the
exploratory well did not acquire any interest in the leases beyond
their interest in the well site, but the cover letter for the private
placement memorandum said that they would each have the op-
tion to participate in subsequent wells "on an additional 700 acres
(approximately) to be designated by Nico from acreage it presently
has under lease.""1 Quincy James bought into the deal.
The exploratory well was successful, and during the next two
years Nico drilled ten more successful wells in the 711-acre area
26. The Fifth Circuit followed the lead of the Eleventh Circuit in concluding that
Shores did not restrict the presumption of reliance to cases in which fraud makes possible
the sale of otherwise unmarketable securities. Shores was decided before the Fifth Circuit
was split, and thus, it is binding in the Eleventh Circuit as well as in the Fifth. In Lipton v.
Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985), the
Eleventh Circuit explained that in Shores the court adopted a theory of fraud on the unde-
veloped market, but had no reason to adopt a theory of fraud on the open market. 734 F.2d
at 745. The court went on to adopt the open-market theory in Lipton, finding it implicitly
approved in Shores. Id. at 747; see also Shores v. Sklar, 844 F.2d 1485 (11th Cir. 1988). In
Lipton, 734 F.2d at 746-47, the Eleventh Circuit held that the developed market's reliance
on specific misrepresentations permits a presumption of individual reliance in actions under
the second clause of rule 10b-5, but the Fifth Circuit refused to go so far in Finkel.
27. 838 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1988).
28. Id. at 1367.
29. Id. at 1366-67.
30. Id. at 1367.
31. Id. An investor would have the option only so long as he participated in all pros-
pects offered him. Id.
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outside the flood plain.32 James invested in five of the additional
wells, but Nico did not give him an opportunity to participate in
the other five, which it drilled with its own funds. James also par-
ticipated in another well drilled by an oil company that bought
Nico's interest in the tract. James invested a total of $317,000 in
seven wells and received in return more than $1,866,000.' 3 None-
theless, he sued for part of the profits from the five wells Nico
drilled with its own funds."4
James presented a number of theories of recovery, all related
to the option set out in the cover letter for the private placement
materials. Among other things, he claimed that he had a contrac-
tual right to participate in the five non-investor wells and that he
had been defrauded within the meaning of the federal and Texas
securities statutes and Texas statutory and common law.3 5 The
district court granted the defendants summary judgment on the
fraud claims, but permitted James' case to go to the jury on his
contract claim. James introduced parol evidence to show that Nico
had agreed to allow him to participate in all wells on the 711 non-
flood-plain acres, and the jury awarded him a substantial recovery
for Nico's breach of contract.36
The court of appeals set aside the verdict on the breach of
contract because the cover letter did not identify the land under
option with sufficient specificity to satisfy the statute of frauds.3 7
The court affirmed the summary judgment on the state law fraud
claims because James had not presented any evidence of misrepre-
sentation in response to the defendant's motion.3 8 The court took a
different approach in affirming the summary judgment on the rule
10b-5 claim, however, concluding that James could not prove com-
pensable injury." According to the court, "[o]bviously, to say that
James suffered an injury in the security transaction cannot be
taken seriously."' 0
The courts have not clearly articulated how damages are to be
determined in cases brought under rule 10b-5 or what relief suc-
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1367-68.
35. Id. at 1368.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1368-69.
38. Id. at 1372.
39. Id. at 1371.
40. Id.
103519891
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cessful plaintiffs are due." A wide variety of misconduct in a wide
variety of circumstances has been successfully challenged under
the rule, and perhaps no simple statement can encompass the inju-
ries the rule addresses or the relief it affords. Nonetheless, the case
of a deceived buyer who makes money presents a novel setting for
considering injury and remedy. An examination of the way the
court used the measure of damages it deemed appropriate in this
setting may show that there are indeed reasons to allow some de-
frauded investors to recover more than their out-of-pocket
damages.
In James, the court started its discussion of injury by stating
that the typical defrauded buyer recovering under rule 10b-5 is en-
titled to out-of-pocket damages, that is, "the difference between
the market price of the stock and the price that the plaintiffs
paid.""' James argued that instead of out-of-pocket damages, he
was entitled to a share of the profits in all the wells drilled on the
711 nonflood-plain acres. James relied on Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States,"5 in which the Supreme Court allowed defrauded
sellers to recover the profits their buyers' made on resale. Although
it recognized that Affiliated Ute can be read to entitle defrauded
investors to their malefactors' profits, the court of appeals chose to
treat it as only a special application of the out-of-pocket rule
under which defrauded sellers may look to future developments in
measuring the value of the stock they sell." As for James, the
41. See generally 4 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES
FRAUD §§ 9.1-.3 (1979); D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 614-18 (1973); T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 470 (1985); 5C A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 1OB-5 §§
259-265 (1988); L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 965-75 (2d ed. 1988); M.
STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 7.06 (1988); Crane, An
Analysis of Causation Under Rule 10b-5, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 99 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel,
Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1985); Merritt, A Consistent
Model of Loss Causation in Securities Fraud Litigation: Suiting the Remedy to the Wrong,
66 TEX. L. REv. 469 (1988); Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A
Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349 (1984); Note, Rule 10b-5
Damage Computation: Application of Financial Theory to Determine Net Economic Loss,
51 FORDHAM L. REV. 838 (1983); Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule lOb-5 Cases In-
volving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371 (1974).
42. 838 F.2d at 1371.
43. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
44. 838 F.2d at 1371. James did not involve fraud on a seller, so the court did not
develop its interpretation of Affiliated Ute. At one point, it said that the fraudulent buyer's
resale price "may be deemed the market value ... for the purposes of calculating the out-
of-pocket injury." Id. If this is so, then a defrauded seller will be entitled to all of her
buyer's profit, even that due to factors entirely unrelated to the fraud, including, for exam-
ple, appreciation attributable to a market-wide increase in security prices. However, the
[Vol. 341036
Securities Law
court concluded that even if future developments were to be con-
sidered in his case, his security was worth far more than he paid
for it. Accordingly, he had no "injury even under the calculation
rationale of disgorgement."45 The court found "no reason in equity
or policy or precedent to apply any rule that is an exception to the
traditional out-of-pocket measure of damages."''
The court insisted that its conclusion that James suffered no
compensable injury was compelled by "controlling precedent of the
Fifth Circuit requiring the application of the out-of-pocket rule in
the case before us."'47 James suffered no injury, the court reasoned,
because under settled law there could be no recovery. The Fifth
Circuit has consistently held that a defrauded buyer is entitled to
recover the difference between the price she paid for a security and
the value of what she received, with what she received being val-
ued as of the time of the transaction. Assuming, as the court did,
that James proved all the elements of a rule 10b-5 case other than
injury, the case came down to comparing the value of what James
bought with what he paid for it.
The price James paid would not have been hard to deter-
mine,48 but the value of what he received would have been. The
court apparently concluded that determining the value of what
James bought was not necessary since he ultimately made a profit.
In equating initial value with subsequent return, the court ignored
the fact that when James bought the security he accepted a sub-
stantial risk that he would not make any profit at all. It was inap-
propriate to ignore that risk-in fact, that risk was the heart of the
security. James' investment carried with it the possibility of a
spectacular return, but when he invested no one could know what
the return would be. That uncertainty explains Nico's willingness
to take $317,000 for an interest that eventually paid $1,866,000 and
James' willingness to pay $317,000 for an interest that might have
paid nothing.
court may not have meant this because it went on to say that for the purpose of the out-of-
pocket rule, the value of a defrauded seller's securities are "measured at a reasonable time
after the sale, i.e., after the concealed information has been disclosed to the general public
and the stock reflects its true value." Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Although James made several separate investment decisions, the court lumped all
his investments together and netted them against his total return from all the wells to de-
termine he had not been injured by any fraud in connection with his option.
19891 1037
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What was the value of James' interest when he bought it if it
was not the $1,866,000 he eventually received as owner? It may be
impossible to say. Determining the value of a security is seldom a
simple task, and it would not have been a simple task in James.
Measuring the value of tangible assets is hard enough, and measur-
ing the value of securities is even harder. Presumably, many nego-
tiated trades occur precisely because the buyer and the seller disa-
gree on value.
When a security is traded somewhat regularly, market prices
may supply satisfactory evidence of value. Value may mean noth-
ing more than the price at which fully informed buyers and sellers
are willing to trade.49 In reasonably well-developed markets, trad-
ers respond quickly to the revelation of new information. All other
things being equal, the value of a security as to which a misrepre-
sentation has been made is its market price after the fraud is dis-
covered and the truth made known. Of course, developments in the
issuer and the market that have nothing to do with the fraud may
cause the market price of the security to change during the period
the fraud remains undetected. However, the price at which the se-
curity would have traded but for the fraud can at least be esti-
mated by factoring out the effects of intervening events.
James expresses the out-of-pocket measure as "the difference
between the market price of the stock and the price that the plain-
tiffs paid,"5 but as far as appears in the opinion, there never was a
market for interests in the Nico wells. The court simply treated
subsequent issuer distributions as the equivalent of subsequent
market price. If James' security had been traded in a market, dis-
closure of the oil find probably would have pushed its price above
what James paid. But such a market reaction would not have
shown whether, when James bought the security, it was worth
what he paid for it. If Nico's deception had been revealed before
the oil find and the security's market price had fallen below the
purchase price, James would presumably be said to have suffered
an out-of-pocket loss equal to the decline. That out-of-pocket loss
would not be recalculated if market price jumped dramatically
upon subsequent disclosure of the oil find.51
49. Market prices may be taken to reflect intrinsic value, or they may themselves be
the only value that matters.
50. 838 F.2d at 1371.
51. Similarly, if the oil find was disclosed first and disclosure of the deception de-
pressed the market price, but left it above what James paid, it might well be said that
1038 [Vol. 34
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The security James bought can usefully be compared to a lot-
tery ticket." A lottery ticket that gives its holder a right to partici-
pate in drawings for several prizes including a top prize of a mil-
lion dollars is not worth a million dollars. Instead, it is worth what
that right is worth. If the value of that right is the price at which
willing buyers and sellers will trade it, and if tickets sell for a dol-
lar, then any particular ticket is worth a dollar. A ticket will be
worth a million dollars when and if it turns out to be the grand
prize winner, but certainly in an important sense the winning
ticket is not worth a million dollars the day before the drawing.
The day before the drawing it is worth a dollar." A junior ticket
that entitles the holder to participate in all the drawings except
that for the grand prize is worth less than a regular ticket. If the
junior ticket wins a thousand dollars it will be worth a thousand
dollars, but before the drawing it is not worth a thousand dollars
and is in fact worth less than a regular one dollar ticket.
James is important not because the court reached a wrong
conclusion about the value of what James bought, but because the
court did not try to reach a conclusion. The opinion begins and
ends emphasizing that James was complaining about a deal on
James had suffered an out-of-pocket loss, notwithstanding his net profit on the investment.
Perhaps he would be entitled to recover a part of his purchase price proportional to the
decline in the security's market price occasioned by revelation of the fraud.
It may be helpful to consider the case that would have been presented had the Nico
leases proved dry. The hypothetical James might be entitled to rescind the deal and get his
money back on account of Nico's misrepresentations, but he would not recover any out-of-
pocket damages. See In re Letterman Bros. Energy Sec. Litig., 799 F.2d 967, 973 (5th Cir.
1986) ("Leases that permit the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources are of con-
siderable value."), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987). Because the failure of the investment
did not relate to the misrepresented facts, and the risk of failure was fully and honestly
disclosed, his loss was not proximately caused by Nico's misrepresentations. See Huddleston
v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d at 549-50, 555. Yet the approach suggested in James would
allow the hypothetical James to recover his entire purchase price, based on the reasoning
that inasmuch as the security turned out to be worthless, it was worthless when it was sold.
If James would not have been permitted to recover actual losses not proximately caused
by the misrepresentation, then his dishonest seller should not be permitted to avoid liability
because James realized a profit, unless the profit somehow reveals that the misrepresenta-
tion caused James no harm. The fact that James did profit on his investment does not show
that Nico's misrepresentations did not cause him any harm. If Nico had told the truth or
had been telling the truth, James' profit would have been even more dramatic.
52. The analogy to a lottery ticket is not perfect because careful analysis of the well
site could have produced significant insights into its value. Nevertheless, in the end no one
can be sure what either a well or a ticket will produce. Perhaps a bet on a horse race would
be a better analogy.
53. Conversely, if the ticket turns out to be a loser, it was still worth a dollar when it
was purchased.
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which he made a substantial profit, and the case may come to
mean that a defrauded buyer who sells at a profit or otherwise re-
ceives a return in excess of her total investment cannot recover
under rule 10b-5."' James' problem was that, inasmuch as he made
money on the deal, it is not readily apparent that he should re-
cover anything, even if what he got was worth less than what he
paid for it.
The out-of-pocket measure of damages used in rule 10b-5
cases in the Fifth Circuit is appropriate if the purpose of the rem-
edy is to make sure that defrauded buyers get their money's worth.
Buyers who make bad deals are not normally entitled to go to
court to get their money's worth. Thus, identifying what it is about
fraud that entitles defrauded buyers to be treated differently is im-
portant.5 The unusual facts of James show that misrepresenta-
tions do more than leave the deceived party with something worth
less than what she paid for it. A wrong of fraud is that the victim
does not get that for which she pays. Fraud is wrong even if what
the victim does get is worth the price.
Victims of fraud rightly complain when they rely on misrepre-
sentations to their detriment. The consequence of a victim's reli-
ance is the measure of her injury. Victims rely on misrepresenta-
tions by making deals they would not otherwise make. In doing so,
they may part with money or valuable goods or services, but they
may also pass up alternative deals. If James relied on Nico's mis-
representations, he relied by buying this security instead of an-
other. If he was to be compensated for that reliance, he should
have been given the value of the security he would have bought.
James probably could not have identified the particular security he
would have bought but for Nico's misrepresentations. However, the
value of what Nico falsely told him he was buying is an appropri-
ate measure of the value of what James passed up and, likewise, of
what he should be entitled to recover. Nico presumably did not
54. Fifth Circuit cases permitting recovery of consequential damages, such as James v.
Meinke, 778 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1985), which James v. Nico cites for the basic rule, 838 F.2d
at 1371, suggest that purchase price is not a ceiling on rule 10b-5 recovery. See also Wolf v.
Frank, 477 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975 (1973).
55. If a seller knowingly misleads a buyer, the buyer may be permitted to rescind the
transaction regardless of her injury. However, defrauded buyers are entitled to rescind and
get restitution, not because they deserve compensation, but because telling lies is bad and
liars should not retain the fruits of their wrongful acts. Because James did not want to
rescind the transaction, the court appropriately considered how the misrepresentation in-
jured him.
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make any more of a misrepresentation than it thought was neces-
sary to get James to buy.56 Courts generally have recognized as
much, and the benefit of the bargain is the measure of recovery
usually afforded for fraud, and in analogous actions, for breach of
warranty.
Awarding defrauded buyers like James the benefit of their
bargains might also further the public policies usually identified
with the federal securities statutes.5" If the courts do not protect
reliance by awarding the benefit of the bargain in cases in which it
is the best measure of reliance, then investors will have to protect
themselves. They can do so by investigating the truth of the repre-
sentations made to them before investing. Denying compensatory
damages may sometimes be appropriate to encourage investors to
investigate. For example, perhaps investors injured by relying on
negligent misrepresentations should be denied any recovery if they
could have discovered the truth by exercising minimal prudence.
Allowing recovery in such cases might force issuers to waste money
checking the accuracy of representations that investors could check
much more cheaply. Investigation is costly, though, and sellers of
securities must compensate buyers for the investigations they feel
they must make. Inasmuch as the cost of capital to security issuers
reflects the cost of these investigations, the law should not en-
courage investor investigation unless in so doing it furthers a legiti-
mate interest of issuers or others. 8 No one has a legitimate reason
knowingly to misrepresent the terms of a security for the purpose
of inducing someone to buy it, and investors should not be given
the burden of investigating deliberate lies of the sort James appar-
ently alleged he was told.
56. The perpetrator of a fraud is not liable under rule 10b-5 unless she acted with
scienter, and, perhaps, it would be neither unjust nor unwise to forbid perpetrators even to
try to prove they lied more than was necessary.
57. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 41, develop the thesis that sanctions for securi-
ties fraud should encourage conduct consistent with the ends of the securities laws.
58. The sanctions available under the securities laws may affect the cost and allocation
of capital even if investors ignore the availability of judicial remedies in deciding how much
investigation to undertake. No matter what remedy investors are eventually given, their
capital may be wasted if they rely on misrepresentations. The threat of substantial sanc-
tions may prevent misrepresentations from being made in the first place.
59. James' rule 10b-5 claim is not set out in the opinion. The court said it assumed
James could prove "a material misrepresentation or omission, scienter and reliance," but in
its discussion of his state law fraud claims it emphasized that he had failed to present any
evidence of any misrepresentation. 838 F.2d at 1370. If James' claim was simply that Nico
failed to tell him it would drill its own wells in the nonflood-plain area, what Nico did wrong
is not clear. Deceit is as much an element of a rule 10b-5 violation as it is an element of
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The court "could find no reason in equity or policy" to allow
James to recover more than "the traditional out-of-pocket measure
of damages. '60 Nevertheless, the courts might better compensate
victims and reduce the cost of raising capital by measuring dam-
ages in terms of the bargain in appropriate circumstances." Courts
usually limit victims to recovery of out-of-pocket damages, 2 and of
course there are often good reasons for this recovery. For example,
it may be impossible to determine what the security would have
been worth if the seller's representations had been true. However,
warranty damages are not always difficult to prove, and out-of-
pocket loss is not always certain. In James, for instance, determin-
ing the value of what Nico promised would probably have been
much easier than determining the value of what James bought at
the time he bought it. In the end, each wrong should determine its
own remedy. All wrongs may not merit the same remedy.
CARELESS PLAINTIFFS
The success of a fraud case often depends on the way the vic-
tim responds when she learns she has been defrauded or when in-
formation that might alert her to the fraud becomes available to
her. Victims who fail to act or who act inappropriately may be
barred from recovering because of laches, waiver, ratification, want
of due care, or the statute of limitations. The conduct of plaintiffs
fraud. If Nico did not misrepresent anything, it could not have deceived James unless it had
an affirmative obligation to disclose its drilling plans, which does not seem to have been the
case.
60. Id. at 1371.
61. The usual objections to awarding a warranty measure of damages are most compel-
ling when the fraud relates to a publicly traded security. See generally Easterbrook & Fis-
chel, supra note 41. The market often discounts misrepresentations of material fact, in
which case investors who rely on misrepresentations pay the appropriate price for a security
and do not in fact suffer any out-of-pocket loss. If the market is fooled, out-of-pocket
loss-for instance, the decline in market price occasioned by revelation of the fraud-may
be the appropriate measure of injury. Recovery of more than out-of-pocket loss is deserved
only to the extent the plaintiff gave up some unusually profitable opportunity in reliance on
the misrepresentation. However, the market does not often offer unusually profitable oppor-
tunities. When a misrepresentation is made during the course of face-to-face negotiations
over a security deal, it is perhaps appropriate to assume that the misrepresentation would
not have been made unless the victim in fact had attractive alternative investments. See
supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. However, this assumption is not justified when
misrepresentation is made to the public at large, especially when it is made by a person who
is not even selling securities. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978.
62. Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1982), provide for
rescisionary relief. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982) (no recovery under Exchange Act in excess
of actual damages).
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was the determinative consideration in several of the securities
cases the Fifth Circuit decided during the survey period.
In Stephenson v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,6" the
court reaffirmed that rule 10b-5 plaintiffs must prove that they
have pursued their own interests with care and good faith."' The
plaintiff in that case, Monroe Stephenson, sued his brokerage firm
and his account executive for effecting sixty-seven securities trans-
actions for his account without his authorization." Between Au-
gust 1982 and August 1983 Stephenson had received confirmations
and monthly statements reflecting all of the trades, but he testified
that he regarded this material as junk mail and he admitted he
never opened most of it."' Stephenson testified that he complained
to his account executive about one unauthorized trade in October
1982 and another in June 1983, but he first complained in writing
in August 1983, and then only to his account executive and only
about a relatively small number of trades.6 7 Stephenson finally
wrote the firm in September 1983, at which time he identified
fifty-nine transactions he claimed were unauthorized."' Stephenson
brought suit in May 1984, complaining that the unauthorized trad-
ing violated several laws, including rule 10b-5. He attempted to
prove that the firm had supervised his account executive inade-
quately and that the firm would have learned of the unauthorized
trading earlier if it had supervised properly."'
The district court dismissed the rule 10b-5 claim at the close
of Stephenson's case, and Stephenson appealed.70 The court of ap-
peals affirmed because Stephenson failed to prove that he had ex-
ercised due diligence to protect his own interest." As part of his
case, Stephenson had to prove he was not reckless.72 The district
63. 839 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 310 (1988).
64. But cf. MBank-Fort Worth, N.A. v. Trans Meridian, Inc., 820 F.2d 716, 725 (5th
Cir. 1987) (plaintiff does not have burden of proving due diligence under Texas Blue Sky
Law).
65. 839 F.2d at 1096.
66. Id. at 1097.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. The district court also found that the claim was barred by laches, waiver, and
ratification. The court of appeals did not consider the plaintiff's challenges to these findings
because it affirmed the dismissal on the basis of the plaintiff's recklessness. Id. at 1100 n.13.
72. Id. at 1098. "[T]he relevant inquiry is whether the plaintiff has 'intentionally re-
fused to investigate "in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be
taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would
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court found that he had been reckless in failing to read his account
statements and in failing to notify the firm promptly of the
problems he did discover. The court of appeals agreed, citing Ste-
phenson's "high level of education, experience, and demonstrated
prowess in financial and securities matters" as critical factors in its
decision.7
Before the Fifth Circuit, Stephenson argued that his conduct
was irrelevant.74 He contended that, notwithstanding settled Fifth
Circuit law 75 rule 10b-5 plaintiffs should not be required to prove
their due diligence, and defendants should not be able to escape
liability on the basis of various affirmative defenses based on plain-
tiffs' unreasonable conduct.7 6. Stephenson argued that the require-
ment that plaintiffs prove due diligence and affirmative defenses
based on a plaintiff's failure to pursue his interests diligently could
not survive the Supreme Court's decision in Bateman Eichler, Hill
Richards, Inc. v. Berner.7
The plaintiffs in Bateman Eichler alleged that an employee of
the defendant brokerage firm induced them to buy securities by
telling them that insiders had told him the issuer had valuable
rights in African gold mines. 78 They sued after the price of the se-
curities fell, but the district court dismissed their complaint for
failure to state a claim under rule 10b-5. The court held that since
the plaintiffs violated rule 10b-5 themselves by trading on nonpub-
lic information, the doctrine of in pari delicto barred recovery. 0
follow."' " Id. (quoting Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1020 (5th Cir.) (quoting in turn W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 185 (4th ed. 1971)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977)).
73. Id. at 1100; see also id. at 1097 n.6. The court explained that Stephenson was
competent to have reviewed his account "statements, as most people do their monthly bank
statements, and discern a pattern of error." Id. at 1100.
74. Inasmuch as the finding of recklessness was one of fact not to be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, the court's affirmation is not surprising. Indeed, it was not clear to the
court that Stephenson even challenged the finding. Id. at 1099.
75. The Fifth Circuit thoroughly re-examined the relevance of a plaintiff's want of
care in a rule 10b-5 case in Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1020. The re-examination was
prompted by Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), in which the Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff has to prove more than the defendant's negligence to establish scienter
under rule 10b-5. Dupuy reaffirmed that only plaintiffs who have used due diligence to take
care of their own interests can recover under the rule. Plaintiffs need prove only that they
were not reckless, but they have the burden of proving at least this level of care. 551 F.2d at
1020. The court has consistently looked to Dupuy when faced with the contention that a
plaintiff's want of care should bar recovery. See 839 F.2d at 1098 n.9.
76. 839 F.2d at 1098.
77. 472 U.S. 299 (1985).
78. Id. at 301-02.
79. Id. at 304.
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The Supreme Court disagreed and held that
a private action for damages in these circumstances may be barred
on the grounds of the plaintiff's own culpability only where (1) as a
direct result of his own actions, the plaintiff bears at least substan-
tially equal responsibility for the violations he seeks to redress, and
(2) preclusion of suit would not significantly interfere with the effec-
tive enforcement of the securities laws and protection of the invest-
ing public."0
Stephenson argued that "Bateman Eichler essentially abol-
ished the due diligence requirement for private 10b-5 actions."'
However, he was unable to convince the court of appeals that re-
quiring plaintiffs to prove they were not reckless undercuts the
policies of the federal securities laws.82 The court explained that
Bateman Eichler was the result of the Supreme Court's "concern
that insider trading may go largely undiscovered by law enforce-
ment officials if tippees are altogether precluded by in pari delicto
from bringing suit against tippers."s It reasoned that the due dili-
gence requirement and equitable defenses like waiver, laches, es-
toppel, and ratification "ultimately foster the same law enforce-
ment goal as Bateman Eichler, but from a different perspective. '84
According to the Fifth Circuit, a court appropriately denies recov-
ery to an investor who has not been attentive to self-protection, at
least when the plaintiff has not participated in any securities law
violations.85
Stephenson draws valid and important distinctions between
doctrines based on want of care and the doctrine of in pari delicto.
One can conclude, as the court apparently did, that "requiring
plaintiffs to invest carefully" will discourage fraud, 6 and an anti-
fraud scheme could logically permit plaintiffs who have partici-
80. Id. at 310-11.
81. 839 F.2d at 1098 (citing Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. 299).
82. The court did not set out Stephenson's argument, but said only that it was an
"analogy, founded on general references to the deterrent aspects of the federal securities
laws." Id. at 1099. See generally Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 10b-5:
Should Careless Plaintiffs Be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 96, 129-37 (1985).
83. 839 F.2d at 1099 (emphasis in original).
84. Id.
85. Id. The court "acknowledge[d] that... it might be logically inconsistent" to bar
recovery by a tippee on grounds of waiver, estoppel, or ratification. Id. at n.10.
86. Id. at 1099 (quoting Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1014). Similarly, the best way to keep
account executives from unauthorized trading may be to require investors like Stephenson
to supervise them.
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pated in a fraud to sue their confederates while denying any rem-
edy to those who fail to take care of themselves. Nonetheless, dis-
tinctions may not be enough to distinguish Bateman Eichler.
The rules that will best serve the public in the end may not be
the ones that will lead to effective enforcement of the securities
laws. For example, courts might best protect the public by apply-
ing the rule of caveat emptor, but to do so would hardly lead to
effective enforcement of the provisions of the securities laws that
proscribe false statements.8 In Bateman Eichler, the Court
seemed to be concerned at least as much with the enforcement of
the securities laws as with the accomplishment of their ends.8 8 The
court said as much in Stephenson8 but it failed to consider the
effect of its decision on the enforcement of rule 10b-5. Be that as it
may, Stephenson will probably influence other courts when they
reconsider the doctrine of due diligence in the light of Bateman
Eichler and Pinter v. Dahl,90 the Supreme Court's latest foray into
in pari delicto.
The court also considered the relevance of a victim's failure to
discover fraud or failure to respond quickly and effectively upon
discovery of fraud in several cases in which the statute of limita-
tions was pleaded as a defense. 91 Davis v. A.G. Edwards & Sons,
Inc.,92 is one such case. Davis does not establish any new securities
law, but it underscores the importance of careful pleading.
Dr. Davis and his son complained that their account executive
and his firm were liable to them for churning their accounts.9 3 The
court borrowed Louisiana's two-year statute of limitations and ap-
plied it to the Davises' rule 10b-5 claims.94 Under federal law, the
two years began to run when the plaintiffs had knowledge of the
facts forming the basis of their action.9 5 The Davises brought their
87. Cf. Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 315.
88. See Sachs, supra note 82, at 132-33.
89. "Thus, Bateman Eichler specifically limits its holding regarding the inapplicability
of the in pari delicto defense to situations where preclusion of suit would interfere with the
enforcement of the securities laws." 839 F.2d at 1099 (citing Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S.
299).
90. 108 S. Ct. 2063 (1988).
91. In addition to the cases discussed below, see Jensen v. Snellings, 841 F.2d 600 (5th
Cir. 1988). In Jensen, the court affirmed a summary judgment dismissing a rule 10b-5 claim
as time barred.
92. 823 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1987).
93. Id. at 107.
94. Id.
95. Id. In Jensen v. Snellings, the court suggested that defendants have the burden of
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actions more than two years after they closed their accounts, but
they argued that they did not know of any problems when they
closed their accounts and became suspicious only later when Dr.
Davis discovered that their account executive had lied to him
about a transaction. 6 Unfortunately, the Davises alleged in their
complaints that they closed the accounts "as a result of Defend-
ants' excessive and objectionable trading practices. 97 Although Dr.
Davis stated in an affidavit that he did not suspect any of the de-
fendants of wrongdoing until he discovered the lie, the court
treated the allegations of the complaints as the plaintiffs' admis-
sions that they knew the basic facts more than two years before
they commenced their actions. Inasmuch as the admissions were
contained in the pleadings, they were conclusively binding on the
plaintiffs. 9
Romano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith" dealt pri-
marily with alleged abuses in connection with a commodities fu-
tures trading account,100 but the Stephenson court suggested that
Romano is precedent for securities cases;' 0 ' its treatment of limita-
tions in churning cases is interesting. Romano suggests that receipt
of a trade confirmation or account statement starts the running of
the statute of limitations, at least as to the confirmed or accounted
transactions, 11 unless the investor can show that the information
proving that plaintiffs should have discovered fraud so as to start the limitations period.
"To prevail on their affirmative defense of prescription, the defendants had to show that
more than two years prior to bringing suit under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the plaintiffs had
knowledge sufficient to begin the running of the limitations period." 841 F.2d at 606. The
court did not say who has the burden of proving notice or knowledge in the other cases in
which it discussed the matter. See generally 5C A. JACOBS, supra note 41, § 235.03, at 10-43
to -55.
96. 823 F.2d at 107.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 108.
99. 834 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1987).
100. The plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to recover under rule 10b-5 because the
defendants placed his deposit for his commodities account into a money market account
without his authorization. Id. at 526. The court of appeals noted that it was undisputed that
transactions in the money market account were "technically securities transactions," id. at
n.4, but it affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the rule 10b-5 claim because
the plaintiff could not identify any loss resulting from having idle funds placed in an in-
come-producing account. Id. at 528. The court affirmed the dismissal of a related RICO
claim because there was no predicate securities fraud inasmuch as there was no rule 10b-5
violation. Id. at 526-27.
101. Stephenson, 839 F.2d at 1100 n.14.
102. The district court held that the statute of limitations barred the churning cause
of action only to the extent that it was based on trades prior to March 1983. 834 F.2d at 528.
The court of appeals did not consider the propriety of parsing a churning claim, but perhaps
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included in the statements was insufficient to provide notice of the
claim.
The plaintiff in Romano sued his brokerage firm and several of
its affiliates, complaining among other things of churning of his
commodities account.103 The defendants moved for summary judg-
ment on the basis of the statute of limitations, and the district
court granted the motion as to that part of the churning claim
based on trades occurring more than two years before the suit was
filed.104 The plaintiff appealed, and the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission (CFTC) filed a brief as amicus curiae in which it
urged the court of appeals to disapprove what it took to be the the
district court's holding-that as a matter of law the statute of limi-
tations for a churning claim begins to run upon a customer's re-
ceipt of monthly account statements." 5
The court of appeals started from the proposition that the
statute of limitations did not begin to run until the plaintiff had
knowledge of the churning or notice of facts that should have led
him to that knowledge. 106 The dispositive question was whether
the plaintiff had notice. The record contained no evidence that the
plaintiff lacked notice. To the contrary, the court found substantial
evidence of notice in that the plaintiff regularly received confirma-
tions of his trades and received monthly statements reflecting all
notice sufficient to bar an action as to part of a churning violation should bar the entire
action. The essence of a churning claim is not that particular trades are inappropriate, but
rather that the account has been traded excessively. As the court said in Romano, churning
is a unified offense. Id. (quoting Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 327 (5th Cir.
1981)). Once a customer is aware of facts that would put her on notice of a pattern of
excessive trading, she presumably has notice of the whole violation. It is arguable that once
the limitations period begins to run, it should run for the whole offense, even if the offense
continues. Cf. D. DOBBS, supra note 41, at 336-37 (permanent nuisance).
103. 834 F.2d at 525.
104. Id. at 528. Thereafter the court dismissed the churning claim to the extent it was
not barred by limitations because the plaintiff failed to prove his case. The court of appeals
affirmed this dismissal. Id. at 529. The court looked to securities cases to define the offense
of churning, and its brief discussion may serve as precedent for securities cases. Among
other things, a churning plaintiff must show that the defendant broker exercised control
over trading in the account. The court observed that the defendants made recommendations
to Romano, but found that Romano exercised control. "The investment decisions were his;
the account was nondiscretionary." Id. If the court intended to say that only discretionary
accounts can be churned illegally, its holding would be novel. See 2 A. BROMBERG & L. Low-
ENFELS, supra note 41, § 5.7(321), at 5:82.95- .102; N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo,
REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS § 2.11 (1977 & Supp. 1988).
105. 834 F.2d at 529 n.12.
106. Id. at 528.
1048 [Vol. 34
1989] Securities Law 1049
transactions involving his account.'07
The court emphasized that the question of notice is one of
fact.' It stated that receipt of statements and confirmations does
not constitute notice as a matter of law because a record of trades
does not in itself show that trading was excessive. 0 9 However, the
court considered the district court's decision and concluded it was
correct based on the undisputed evidence. 110 The defendants had
apprised the plaintiff of trading activity in his account by means of
account statements and other correspondence. The court held that
the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the basis of
evidence that the plaintiff had notice of the activity in his account
because the plaintiff had not produced any evidence tending to
show he was ignorant of his claim or confused about it."'
Assuming that account'statements contain information which,
107. Id. at 528-29.
108. The court re-emphasized that the question of notice is one of fact in Corwin v.
Marney, Orton Investments, 843 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1988). This was the second appeal of a
case in which the plaintiffs complained, among other things, that the offering materials they
had received before buying interests in a limited partnership failed to reveal a promoter's
interest in an entity doing business with the partnership. Id. at 196. The first appeal was
from an order dismissing the plaintiffs' rule 10b-5 claim on the basis of its being barred by
the statute of limitations. Id. at 195. The court treated the order as one granting summary
judgment and reversed. The action was barred if the plaintiffs knew or should have known
of the violations two years before filing suit. Corwin v. Marney, Orton Investments, 788 F.2d
1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1986). Although the action was brought more than two years after the
plaintiffs invested, in response to the motion to dismiss, they "alleged and supported their
contentions" that they sued within a few months of learning of the fraud. Id. at 1069. Sum-
mary judgment was inappropriate on the issue of notice because it was not immediately
clear when the investors should have discovered the fraud, and the defendants had not iden-
tified "communications or occurrences which would have alerted the suspicions of a reasona-
bly diligent investor." Id. at 1069.
Following remand, the defendants showed that public records on file with the State of
Texas disclosed the promoter's interest in the related entity. The district court granted the
defendants summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs should have discovered the fraud
the month they invested. Once again the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a trial.
843 F.2d at 195. The defendants argued that because state law often imputes constructive
knowledge of the contents of public records, as a matter of law the plaintiffs should have
known of the information in the records. The court held that regardless of state law notice
rules, it would not hold as a matter of law that reasonably diligent investors examine all
available public records. Id. at 198. Accordingly, the finder of fact should have been given
the question of when the plaintiffs should have known of the fraud so as to start the run-
ning of the limitations period.
109. 834 F.2d at 528. But cf. Stephenson, 839 F.2d at 1099 n.14 (citing authority that
mere receipt of confirmation slips does not provide sufficient notice of churning; however,
the court refrained from ruling on the issue).
110. 834 F.2d at 529.
111. Id.
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upon analysis, would reveal churning," 2 the question of notice will
usually turn on the investor's ability to perform the analysis."' De-
spite the court's insistence that it was dealing only with the record
before it, Romano suggests that at the very least the investor who
has received accurate account statements has the burden of put-
ting that ability in issue." 4 The court clearly held that a brokerage
firm that informed its customer of the activity in her account is
entitled to summary judgment on the question of notice if the cus-
tomer cannot respond with more than her unsupported assertion
that she was not aware of the violation.
1 5
BROKER-DEALERS AND CUSTOMERS
An important function of securities law is the regulation of the
market itself. Many of the institutions that regularly operate in the
market or provide important support services are regulated in al-
most every facet of their operations. Although the statutes and
regulations consist largely of detailed rules for specialized market
participants, most litigated cases are decided under a few provi-
sions that govern the conduct of everyone who participates in the
securities markets. Thus, although regulated brokers or dealers
were defendants in almost all of the cases discussed above, the
cases were decided under principles of general applicability. None-
theless, perhaps the most important developments of the year were
in the area of market regulation.
112. Presumably, defendants are not entitled to prevail on the notice issue if the state-
ments do not contain enough information to reveal the violation. In its brief, the CFTC
argued that churning "cannot be readily detected from account statements." Brief of Ami-
cus Curiae at 7, Romano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 834 F.2d 523 (5th Cir.
1987) (No. 87-3069) [hereinafter Brief].
113. The court's emphasis on the plaintiff's sophistication suggests that the question is
whether the plaintiff should have discovered the violation, not whether a reasonable inves-
tor would have. But see Jensen, 841 F.2d at 608 ("The standard for whether facts sufficient
to commence the limitations period would have been discovered upon reasonable inquiry is
an objective one."); cf. Corwin v. Marney, Orton Invs., 788 F.2d at 1069 (court should con-
sider "communications or occurrences which would have alerted the suspicions of a reasona-
bly diligent investor").
114. The CFTC criticized the district court for apparently failing to consider whether
the "plaintiff even had in his possession information from which an experienced investor
could find evidence of churning." Brief, supra note 112, at 11. The court of appeals appar-
ently assumed that the information in the account statements was sufficient to allow an
investor as sophisticated as the plaintiff to discover the fraud. The court may have deter-
mined that the defendants had demonstrated sufficiency in the district court, or it may have
intended to hold that accurate account statements are presumed sufficient unless the plain-
tiff puts their sufficiency into issue.
115. 834 F.2d at 529.
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The October panic brought issues of market regulation to
center stage. Although it is too early to know whether this atten-
tion will produce substantial changes in the law, during the survey
year there were several important developments in the law regulat-
ing the relationship between brokerage firms and their customers.
Early in the year, the Supreme Court held in Shearson/American
Express v. McMahon" 6 that agreements to arbitrate Exchange
Act 1 7 claims are enforceable in accordance with the provisions of
the Federal Arbitration Act. " 8 Thereafter, the Fifth Circuit dealt
with the retroactive application of the Supreme Court's decision
and discussed the possibility that brokerage firms may sometimes
be obliged to explain to their customers how they compensate their
sales personnel.
In Noble v. Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, Inc.,119 the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that McMahon would govern pending cases, although the
court suggested that it might be inappropriate to order arbitration
in cases that had already gone to trial when McMahon was de-
cided. Noble appears to be the first case to discuss the question of
the retroactive application of McMahon, and its careful analysis is
likely to guide other courts. The court started from the proposition
that cases are decided under the law existing when they are de-
cided, and then asked whether the plaintiff, who wanted to avoid
arbitration, was entitled to an exception.120 The court answered
this question within the framework of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,'2"
in which the Supreme Court identified three factors it had consid-
ered in deciding whether to apply a new decision to events that
took place before the decision was announced: first, whether the
decision established a new principle of law; second, whether retro-
active application of the new rule would further or retard its pur-
pose and operation; and third, whether retroactive application
would be inequitable.
Considering the first factor, the court in Noble found that
while McMahon overturned Fifth Circuit precedent, the change
116. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
117. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, title I, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
118. Act approved July 30, 1947, ch. 392, § 1, 61 Stat. 669 (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)).
119. 823 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1987); see also King v. Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, Inc.,
825 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1987).
120. 823 F.2d at 850.
121. 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971).
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had been foreshadowed in "an unswerving line of Supreme Court
cases expanding the reach of arbitration agreements. ' 122 The court
found that the second factor suggested retroactivity, inasmuch as
there is a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration and no policy
favoring securities litigation.12  Finally, the court saw no injustice
in requiring litigants to arbitrate, at least in cases that had not yet
gone to trial. 24 Given that its Chevron analysis did not on balance
suggest that retroactive application of McMahon is inappropriate,
the court concluded that it should follow the usual rule that fed-
eral cases are decided in accordance with the law as it exists at the
time of decision. 25
The court dealt with another post-McMahon issue in Villa
Garcia v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith Inc.28 The de-
fendants in that case moved the district court to compel the plain-
tiff to arbitrate his section 10(b) claims, which were based on his
allegations that the defendants made numerous unauthorized
trades in his account. 2 7 The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing
among other things that the arbitration agreement was voidable
because the brokerage-firm defendant had violated SEC rule 15c2-
2128 by entering into the agreement. 12 The district court denied
the motion to compel arbitration without recording its reasons,
and the defendants appealed.
With certain exceptions, rule 15c2-2 declared it a fraudulent,
manipulative, or deceptive device for a broker or dealer to enter
into or have in effect an agreement purporting to bind a public
customer to arbitrate future disputes between them arising under
the federal securities laws.'30 The SEC rescinded the rule after the
McMahon decision and while the Villa Garcia appeal was pending,
and the Fifth Circuit held that the rescission should be applied
122. 823 F.2d at 850.
123. Id.
124. Id. The court would not consider the argument that customers might have signed
arbitration agreements only in reliance on precedent holding such agreements unenforce-
able. "[W]e simply could not accept any claim that [the customer] would not have entered
into these non-negotiable pre-printed agreements had he realized that 1934 Act claims
would turn out to be arbitrable." Id. at 851. The court's reaction may foreshadow hostility
to challenges to arbitration agreements grounded in general contract law defenses.
125. Id.
126. 833 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1987).
127. Id. at 546.
128. 17 C.F.R. § 15c2-2 (1987).
129. 833 F.2d at 546.
130. 17 C.F.R. § 15c2-2.
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retroactively.1
Even if customers cannot raise violations of rule 15c2-2 as de-
fenses to motions to compel arbitration, the rule may have a last-
ing impact. While the rule was in effect it forbade brokers and
dealers to use customer agreements calling for arbitration of dis-
putes under the federal securities laws. Even if the rule was inva-
lid, the contracts drafted in compliance with it are still contracts,
and presumably, most contracts entered into while the rule was in
effect exclude disputes governed by the Exchange Act from arbi-
tration. Thus, the Merrill Lynch agreement at issue in Villa Garcia
provided that controversies arising out of it would be arbitrated
"'[e]xcept to the extent that controversies involving claims arising
under the Federal securities laws may be litigated.' "132 The court
of appeals recognized that this language may have excepted the
plaintiff's claim from arbitration, but since the district court had
not explained itself and the case had to be remanded anyway, the
court did not resolve the issue.13
The court dealt with the substantive law governing the rela-
tionship between a securities firm and its customers in Shivangi v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.""4 The case presented the issue of
whether brokerage firms are required to tell their customers how
they compensate their sales personnel. The district court held that
under certain circumstances they must, concluding that a salesman
"recommending a stock must disclose if he will gain financially
from the sale above and beyond normal compensation."' 35 The
court of appeals avoided the question, but in doing so it may have
simply clouded the issue.
The plaintiffs in Shivangi bought 400 shares of an over-the-
counter stock on the advice of their account executive at Dean
Witter.' 36 Dean Witter made a market in the stock, and it sold the
plaintiffs the stock rather than acquiring the stock from a third
party on behalf of its customer. Dean Witter could have acquired
the stock as agent for the plaintiffs, but its policy was to handle
131. 833 F.2d at 547. The defendants did not challenge the plaintiff's right to raise the
firm's violation of the rule as a defense. Id. at 546.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 825 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1987).
135. Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 313, 318 (S.D. Miss. 1985)
(denying defendant's motion for summary judgment); cf. Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 637 F. Supp. 1001, 1003 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
136. 825 F.2d at 887.
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customer transactions in stocks in which it made a market as prin-
cipal unless the customer asked it to act as agent. 3 ' Dean Witter
computed the price it charged the plaintiffs by adding a mark-up
to the lowest price any market maker asked for the stock. The
mark-up was less than the commission Dean Witter would have
charged for acquiring the stock as the plaintiffs' agent, and, thus,
the plaintiffs paid less for the stock than they would have had
Dean Witter acted as their agent. 3 '
When Dean Witter sold a customer an over-the-counter stock
as principal, it paid the account executive responsible for the trade
a portion of the mark-up plus a portion of the spread between the
bid price and the asked price. Although Dean Witter's pricing pol-
icy always resulted in customers paying less for securities in princi-
pal transactions than they would have in agency transactions,
Dean Witter's compensation policy sometimes resulted in account
executives receiving substantially more for principal transactions
than they would for agency transactions when customers bought
over-the-counter securities in which Dean Witter made a mar-
ket.13 9 Thus, the plaintiffs' account executive received $400 for the
trade, as against a commission of between $46.41 and $61.88 he
would have received had Dean Witter acted as the plaintiffs' agent.
When Dean Witter confirmed the sale, it notified the plaintiffs
that it sold as principal and that it was a market maker in the
stock, but no one told the plaintiffs anything about how their ac-
count executive was compensated until after they filed suit.4 0
After a brief rise, the market price of the stock declined stead-
ily, and the plaintiffs sold within a year at a substantial loss. They
then sued their account executive and Dean Witter, and in an
amended complaint alleged that the defendants' failure to disclose
"that Dean Witter offered a credit or bounty to brokers who sold
stocks in which Dean Witter made a market" violated rule 10b-5
and state law.'" The district court denied the defendants' motion
for summary judgment on the issue of whether Dean Witter was
required to disclose the amount of compensation it paid its ac-
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. Account representatives were not paid a portion of the spread when their
clients sold, so they received about the same compensation in agency and principal trades
when clients sold over-the-counter stocks in which Dean Witter made a market. 107 F.R.D.
at 317.
140. 825 F.2d at 887-88.
141. 107 F.R.D. at 315 n.1.
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count executives. The court concluded that "[t]he extra compensa-
tion received by Dean Witter account executives in principal
trades in which Dean Witter makes a market, over and above the
compensation normally received in agency trades, creates a poten-
tial conflict of interest which is a material fact which ought by law
be disclosed to investors.' 1 42 Nonetheless, the court dismissed the
complaint at the end of the plaintiffs' case because the plaintiffs
did not prove that the defendants acted with scienter when they
failed to disclose the premium compensation. 4"
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal on the ground that
the district court's finding that the the plaintiffs had failed to
prove scienter was not clearly erroneous.144 The plaintiffs did not
complain of misrepresentations, but rather of wrongful silence.
Thus, the court had to deal with the rather tricky question of sci-
enter in an omission case. The plaintiffs had to prove "that Dean
Witter acted with actual 'intent to deceive, manipulate, or de-
fraud,' or severe recklessness.' 45 In the case of misrepresentation,
the speaker's knowledge that she is lying can demonstrate an in-
tent to deceive. In the case of wrongful omission, the question of
intent apparently turns on what the defendant who should have
spoken can be charged with knowing about her victim. The plain-
tiffs argued that Dean Witter knowingly and recklessly failed to
disclose the compensation system, but this was not enough accord-
ing to the court because "knowledge of omitted facts does not itself
establish scienter."'14 The district court did not clearly err in find-
ing "that the defendants did not know nor should have known the
danger of misleading the customers by the omission.''147 No evi-
dence was presented to indicate that the defendants actually in-
tended to deceive the plaintiffs by failing to disclose the compensa-
tion system; Dean Witter had complied with the SEC's
confirmation rule 48 and "any danger of misleading the customers
by the omission was not obvious.''419
142. Id. at 318.
143. Id. at 325.
144. 825 F.2d at 889.
145. Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (1987). The rule was amended since the date of the trade.
149. 825 F.2d at 889. The plaintiffs also argued that the district court's finding on
scienter was wrong because they had proved manipulative intent in that the compensation
system was designed to give account executives an incentive to stimulate demand for the
stock toward the end of manipulating the market. The court of appeals rejected this argu-
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The pivotal fact in Shivagni was that none of the defendants
said anything about how the account executive was compensated.
Rule 10b-5 speaks in terms of fraud and deception, and given that
the defendants were silent on the subject of compensation, they
did not violate the rule unless they were under a duty to disclose
compensation or if some statement they made was rendered mis-
leading by virtue of their silence. The district court faced the ques-
tion squarely and found that Dean Witter was required to dis-
close.15° Dean Witter and the Securities Industry Association,
which participated as amicus curiae, thought the question impor-
tant and argued that the firm had no duty to disclose. However,
the court of appeals seemed consciously to avoid discussing or even
raising the question of whether Dean Witter had any obligation to
disclose how it compensated account executives in the first place.
Dean Witter cross appealed and asked the court to vacate or
reverse the district court's finding that account executive compen-
sation was a material fact that should have been disclosed. The
ment as well. The Fifth Circuit cited the Supreme Court's decision in Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
at 199, for the proposition that, as used in section 10(b), the word "manipulative" is virtu-
ally a term of art that refers to arcane practices intended to mislead investors. Id. Although
it suggested that manipulation is only a form of deception, in the end the court did not
define the word; it simply held that to prove that the compensation system was a manipula-
tive device, the plaintiffs had to show more than that it gave the account executive an incen-
tive to sell the stock. Id. at 889-90.
The court did not need to decide whether the plaintiffs showed manipulative intent by
showing that the compensation system encouraged the account executive to sell the stock.
Rule 10b-5 does not forbid manipulative practices; by its terms it forbids false statements
and fraud. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988). The court did not suggest that a negligent misrep-
resentation would be actionable under rule 10b-5 if made with manipulative intent,
whatever that is. Thus, the plaintiffs would not have saved their rule 10b-5 case by proving
that Dean Witter's conduct and intent were manipulative within the meaning of section
10(b). The court's treatment of manipulation is nonetheless important. If compensation sys-
tems are not manipulative devices, then the SEC has no power to regulate them under sec-
tion 10(b) nor, presumably, under the other provisions of the Exchange Act that call upon it
to regulate manipulative practices. The SEC may not have this power, but the court had no
reason to discuss the meaning of manipulation in Shivagni or the cases it relied upon.
150. The two reported opinions of the district court suggest that a brokerage firm has
a duty to disclose unusual compensation arrangements to its customers and that it was nec-
essary to disclose the premium compensation for principal transactions to keep the recom-
mendation from being misleading.
It is generally agreed that firms owe their customers some loyalty and care; the court
did not belabor the matter or even cite authority in Romano when it held that a commodi-
ties broker owes its clients a fiduciary duty. 834 F.2d at 530. The Securities Industry Associ-
ation admitted in its brief as amicus curiae that Dean Witter was obligated to disclose some
information to the plaintiffs; it just denied that Dean Witter had to disclose information
about compensation. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 825
F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-4370).
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court did not review the finding
because the district court's findings on materiality are not final: the
district court made the statements in denying a motion for summary
judgment . . . and in dicta after granting the motion to dismiss for
failure to prove scienter. In any event, the district court's comments
were made before defendants' proof, and doubtlessly lack preclusive
effect.15" '
In avoiding the issue that troubled Dean Witter, the court of ap-
peals may have highlighted it. In any case, the approach the court
took to the case suggests some important questions.
The court did not say what scienter is in an omission case, but
its analysis suggests that the critical question is whether the de-
fendants should have known that the plaintiffs would have been
surprised to learn of the omitted fact. The court emphasized that
the plaintiffs failed to show either that other firms disclosed how
they compensated their sales personnel or that Dean Witter's com-
pensation system affected the price or value of the stock. 52 How-
ever, in intimating that such a showing would have changed the
outcome of the case, the court suggested that those in the securi-
ties business may be required to disclose whatever is important.
It would be a mistake to impose a general duty to disclose ma-
terial information, even if the statutes could be read to support it.
Leaving aside the effect such a duty would have on the discovery
and the dissemination of information, it would place a tremendous
burden on those subject to it. The only way to protect relatively
blameless nondisclosers would be to hold the information they
failed to disclose immaterial. The court did something like this in
Shivangi, emphasizing that "the materiality of [compensation] in-
formation remains an open question today" and characterizing the
district court's finding that the information should have been dis-
closed as a finding on materiality.'53 Yet, if compensation informa-
tion is immaterial, then brokers and dealers may lie about it.
Surely, such a lie would be a serious wrong and a violation of sev-
eral provisions of the securities laws, including rule 10b-5.
The compensation system was material in the sense that a rea-
sonable investor would consider it important in deciding whether
to buy the stock that had been recommended to her; as the court
151. 825 F.2d at 892 (citations omitted).
152. Id. at 889.
153. Id.
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seemed to recognize, by basing compensation in part on the spread
between bid and ask price, Dean Witter gave its account executives
an incentive to recommend thinly traded stocks in which it made a
market. T'5 Even if the account executive recommended the stock
because Dean Witter's best analyst considered it a good invest-
ment, 155 the plaintiffs might have discounted his recommendation
had they known that he would realize more from their purchase of
this stock than he would from their purchase of alternative
investments. 1
56
If the result in Shivangi is correct, it is not because an account
executive's compensation on a given trade is immaterial to her cli-
ents. Rather, the result is correct because Dean Witter had no obli-
gation to volunteer compensation information to the plaintiffs. The
regulatory authorities do not require brokerage firms to disclose
how they compensate sales personnel, and presumably most inves-
tors know that not all products produce the same profits for their
brokers. This does not mean that compensation plans are immate-
rial. It just means that brokers need not disclose compensation,
and it relies on the fact that most investors are prepared to trade
in ignorance of it. Simply put, the federal securites statutes and
the rules promulgated under them do not require the disclosure of
all material information.
CONCLUSION
It may be appropriate to try to characterize the court's ap-
proach to securities law over the past year, but there may not be
any unifying themes or trends at work in the Fifth Circuit's securi-
ties cases.15 7 Perhaps neither individual judges nor the court as a
whole consider enough securities cases to develop what can in any
important sense be called an approach to securities law. None of
the judges decided many securities cases during the survey year,
and the only judge to author more than one signed opinion was a
154. Id. at 887 n.3, 889-90; see also supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text; cf 107
F.R.D. at 316 ("Dean Witter aggressively markets the stocks in which it is a market maker
155. 825 F.2d at 889.
156. The district court emphasized this even after granting the defendants' motion to
dismiss. 637 F. Supp. at 1005.
157. The court did permit district courts to dispose of complaints before considering
the merits in a substantial portion of the securities cases it considered.
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district judge sitting by designation.1 58
The subject matter of the cases the court was called upon to
consider may be more revealing than the way the court dealt with
those cases. The court had almost no occasion to consider the re-
gistration provisions of the Securities Act 151 or the complex regula-
tory structure that governs the securities markets. Instead, the
court's securities docket was dominated by fraud cases brought
under rule 10b-5. So far as appears in the cases decided by the
Fifth Circuit last year, the rule has at last completely eclipsed the
statutes. 60
158. Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1987) (Feldman, J.), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988); Romano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 834 F.2d
523 (5th Cir. 1987) (Feldman, J.).
159. But see United States v. Corn, 836 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1988) (appeal from a con-
viction for criminal contempt for violating injunction against violations of the registration
provisions of the Securities Act).
160. Any survey of securities law would be incomplete and misleading if it failed to
mention the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Plaintiffs alleged RICO violations in almost all the securities cases
the Fifth Circuit considered last year, including Corwin, Davis, James, Jensen, MBank, Ro-
mano, Shivangi, and Stephenson. See generally Wood, Fifth Circuit Survey: Civil RICO, 19
TEX. TECH L. REV. 463 (1988) (survey of Fifth Circuit opinions for year ending June 30,
1987).
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